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The Framing of the 
EU Constitution: An American 
Constitutional Perspective 
Timothy S. Boylan 
Winthrop University 
The ji·aming and enac tm ent of the Constitution of the 
Europea n Union invites comparison with its American 
counte rpart , the Constitution of the United States . Many 
of th e conflicts that animated the Philad elphia conven-
tion of 1787 were pres ent during the EU conference: the 
question of power distribution among larg e and small 
states, the amount of power that a centra l government 
wou ld exercise and the ca ll for specific rig ht s and pro-
tect ions to be codified within the text. Yet the European 
delega tes did not rese mble the American framers, nor did 
they craf t a text that hold s much resemblance to the U.S. 
docu ment . The differences have enabled the EU to create 
a uniquely European constitution, but it has also resulted 
in a degree of complexity-in both its proc ed ural and 
subs tanti ve pro visions-that the U.S. Constitution was 
ab le to avoid. The document as approved faces consider-
ab le chall enges concerning its scope, clarity and legiti -
macy as th e ratifi cation phase takes pla ce. 
Author's Note: I wish to thank Christian Jensen, Dan Sabia and two anonymous review-
ers for their thoughtful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also 
wish to thank Ap1il Lovegrove at Winthrop University for her invaluable administrative 
help throughout this last year. 
Tl II~ .JOURNAL OJ! POLITIC ,\L SC:IENC I•: 
\IOLUM l..i 33 2005 P/\GES 1-37 
2 BOYLAN 
INTRODUCTION 
In July of 2003, the European Commission's Constitutio n Committee released its draft document: a constitution that was a product of sixteen months of debate and deliberatio n. 
The Committee considered over 7000 amendments and revisions 
along the way to a final text of over 300 pages. The propose d 
Constitution had broad political and economic goals. In terms of 
its political arrangements, the European Union sought a single 
text that would codify the multiple and overlapping treaties that 
had preceded it. In an age of independence movements, nationa l-
ism and "Balkanization," Europe hoped that a well-crafted con-
stitution would serve as a point of unification, bringing its 
citizens closer to the common purposes of the Union. The fram-
ers also hoped that it would assist Europe in becoming an effec-
tive competitor to the United States within the global economy. 
Finally, a Charter of Fundamental Rights was folded into the text 
as a manifesto of personal and collective rights that was to be an 
expression of 21st Century ethics and worldview. 
Within a few months it was apparent that there were deep di-
visions between the member states, and that the reasons for argu-
ing and disagreeing were stronger than the reasons for 
compromising and agreeing. A number of these disagreeme nts 
concerned matters of substance, in particular the amount of 
power to be granted to a central EU government and the distrib u-
tion of voting power among the member states. What underlay 
these conflicts was equally significant and far more difficult to 
address . Advocates of the draft constitution had to convince fel-
low delegates that acceptance would not threaten national sover-
eignty, nor exacerbate old tensions and rivalries. 1 This case had 
1 An intriguing challenge to advocates of EU enlargem ent and integration has been the 
emergence of new alliances and rivalries both during and following the accession of ten 
new member nations in May of2004 (see note 3) . While many questions of power dis tri-
Note continues 
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to be made, moreover, while the EU was preparing to accept ten 
new members-most from the old Soviet bloc-and enlarge to 
25 member states. A European Union of greater diversity and 
more pronounced differences was developing on a parallel track 
with the drafting of the constitutional text. By October, the lead-
ers of the 25 present and future EU members broke off talks and 
headed home after reaching an impasse over voting power. By 
mid-December, negotiations collapsed and the constitutional 
treaty was, for the moment, shelved. Plans were made for recon-
sideration under new EU leadership2 before the May, 2004 re-
ception of the ten new member nations. 3 In June of 2004, 
representatives from member nations agreed upon an end prod-
uct that somehow endured the strain of satisfying the different 
interests of the 25 signatory nations. 
In 2005, the EU Constitution faces approval debates and 
votes across the European continent. As an evaluation of the 
process of constitutional enactment and in anticipation of the 
process of ratification, this study will examine the content, struc-
ture and procedural mechanisms of the EU Constitution from the 
bution can be seen in terms of "old" versus "new" Europe , or large versus small nations, 
some new partnerships have developed . One example was the alliance between Spain and 
Poland during the late 2003 conferences as discussed later in this text. Another is the 
economic pronouncements made by the more "euroskeptical " nations of Britain and 
Estonia concerning economic competition and the call for lower levels of taxation. This 
followed the writing of a joint article by Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts and British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, 'The Enlarged EU Must be Free to Compete ," Financial 
Times, 2 November 2003, p. 21. 
2 The rotating leadership of the EU passed from Italy to Ireland at the end of 2003. Many 
participants held out hope that the Irish, minus the controversial and divisive Silvio Ber-
lusconi, would be able to bring the delegates back together in the Spring of 2004, and 
achieve an approved document by June . That did in fact prove to be the case . 
3 The following nations acceded to EU membership on May I, 2004: Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Czech Republic , Hungary, Slovakia , and Poland . 
They will join the current 15 member states : Belgium, Denmark , Germany , Greece, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg , Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom . 
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perspective of American constitutional theory. I posit that fruitful 
and intriguing avenues of analysis and evaluation are revealed 
when the framing and debate of the EU Constitution is compared 
and contrasted with that of its 1787 counterpart , the Constitution 
of the United States. My plan is to assess not only the content of 
the EU document (which has received considerable attention in 
the European press), but also its overall structure and design, or 
context. By locating and evaluating the main substantive and 
procedural challenges posed by the EU Constitution , and by 
drawing comparisons with the U.S. case, I provide both diagnos-
tic and prescriptive insights. For the ratification and ultimate suc-
cess of the document is not a foregone conclusion. European 
leaders struggled for over two years to draft and finalize one of 
the most ambitious and far-reaching governing documents in 
human history. The ultimate success or failure of this Constitu-
tion (and all of the smaller successes and failures along the way) 
will provide valuable lessons that will animate and inspire the 
task of constitution-making in the years to come . 
CONTEXT: 
THE WHO, WHAT, WHE , WHERE,AND HOW OF 
CO STITUTION MAKING 
One of the main purposes of this study is to demonstrate that 
the process of constitution making can often be as important, if 
not more important, than the product that emerges from debate, 
deliberation, and writing. A number of historical and contextual 
observations indicate that certain advantages present during the 
American founding were not found within the recent Convention 
for the Future of Europe. 
We The People? 
A perusal of the proposed Constitution of the European Union 
shows some interesting parallels with, as well as some important 
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departures from, its American counterpart. The Preamble of the 
U.S. text makes clear where primary authority rests, and from 
where power and legitimacy are gained. All powers granted to 
government are from the people. States remain sovereign, and 
the constitutional language links the people and the states as 
sources of authority, but final authority is with the people. 4 There 
is a sense of hierarchy throughout the document as powers are 
delegated to the national government, and then clearly enumer-
ated, while others are reserved to the states and, ultimately, to the 
people. As J.H.H. Weiler (200 I, 56) has noted, "In federations, 
whether American or Australian, German or Canadian, the insti-
tutions of a federal state are situated in a constitutional frame-
work which presupposes the existence of a 'constitutional 
demos,' a single pouvoir constituant made of the citizens of the 
federation in whose sovereignty, as a constituent power, and by 
whose supreme authority the specific constitutional arrangement 
is rooted." 
In this regard, the Constitution of the European Union looks 
like a constitution. It defines and delineates powers, and makes 
demands upon constitutional actors, whether they be member 
states, citizens, or institutions, that closely resemble the require-
ments of other federal systems. In its preamble, it appears to 
draw its authority from both the people and the member states in 
a fashion that is strikingly similar to the U.S. Constitution. For 
Weiler (2001, 57), however, there is the rub: "Europe's constitu-
tional architecture has never been validated by a process of con-
stitutional adoption by a European demos and, hence, as a matter 
of both normative and political principles and empirical social 
observation the European constitutional discipline does not enjoy 
the same kind of authority as may be found in federal states 
4 Constitution of the United States . See the language of the Preamble and the text of the 
Tenth Amendment. 
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where their federalism is rooted in the classic constitutional or-
der." 
In 1787, thirteen colonies bound by a common language, 
heritage and religion came together as a constitutional demos. 
Rivalries and disagreements over economics, slavery and state 
sovereignty were overcome in order to produce a document that 
would sustain the recently won freedom. That which united the 
people was greater than that which divided them. But the current 
25 member nations that are set to ratify the EU draft document 
do not share such characteristics. The cultural and ethnic identity 
and national sovereignty of many member states stretches back 
for centuries. Some have fought protracted wars against 
neighboring nations. Members are separated by language, cus-
tom, and religion (or the lack thereof), and some have just re-
cently regained the freedom to express those beliefs and practice 
those customs. As a result, any attempt to forge a true Union of 
states will face challenges that simply did not exist in the Amer-
ica of the 1780s. 
The question, then, is whether a constitution that lacks a 
demos-a "we the people" that both supports and calls forth the 
document-<:an legitimately claim the authority to bring about a 
new, comprehensive political order. Given the historic rivalries 
between (what are now) some member nations, and the emer-
gence out of Soviet dominance by the majority of the newly ac-
ceded nations, scholars such as Weiler have remained skeptica l. 
This is not to say a genuine union of European states cannot 
evolve, but only that a constitution may not be the most effective 
way to further develop and legitimate such a union. 
The problem can be put another way. Since constitutions 
grant powers to governmental institutions and governments re-
quire legitimacy, any project in constitution-making must seek to 
clearly reflect popular will and secure popular support. The EU 
actors have been acutely aware of this , as one of their key goals 
TlJEJOURNt\L OF POLJTICAL SCIENCE 
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has been to lessen the "legitimacy gap" between the EU institu-
tions and its citizens.5 That "gap" has been defined as the popular 
perception that government under the EU lacks accountability 
and responsiveness to the people. This has been reflected in two 
trends. First, each successive treaty has pushed power away from 
democratically elected national governments and toward institu-
tions and bureaucracies far removed from democratic account-
ability. Second, there has been a long-standing perception that 
the democratically elected European Parliament, the most "rep-
resentative" of the EU institutions, has lost power and prestige to 
the European Commission and the European Council of Minis-
ters.6 The perception of a democratic deficit has dogged efforts 
toward greater consolidation and centralization of power in the 
EU in the past, and it remains a critical problem today.7 Since, as 
at least one seasoned constitution-maker has observed, the "suc-
cess of constitutional government depends on the willingness of 
people to accept and be bound by legitimate governmental deci-
5 Expectations have remained high that this Constitution would help remedy the legiti-
macy gap . As Shaw (2003 , 43) notes, "Since its creation was first announced in Decem-
ber 2001 at the Laeken European Council meeting, very substantial expectations have 
been invested in the Convention on the Future of the Union by many observers of the 
European integration process . Perhaps it could finally address the yawning legitimacy 
gap that appears to have opened up in European public affairs since the time of the Treaty 
of Maastricht, leading to a widespread alienation between the activities of the European 
institutions and those whom they are meant-like any public bodies-to serve, that is, the 
citizens and residents of the member states ." 
6 For the student of American politics and government, understanding the key European 
Union institutions and their functions (Parliament, Commission , Council of the European 
Union, European Council) can be as daunting and difficult as figuring out the British 
game of cricket. For a primer on the EU institutions, see the section entitled "How does 
the Union work?" at Europa, the website of the European Union (http ://europa.eu.int). 
7 The significance of the democratic deficit was clearly shown with the Danish vote that 
turned down the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1992. The perception that 
power would be transferred from accountable national governments to unaccountable 
bureaucracies put a brake on further efforts toward integration. For a lucid and compre-
hensive discussion of the democratic deficit problem , see Andrew Moravcsik (200 I, 161-
187). 
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sions that they greatly fear or intensely dislike" (Seigan, 1994, 
2), there is cause for concern. The past two hundred years are 
littered with constitutions that failed to accomplish such a degree 
of legitimacy and consent. 
Size and Simplicity 
Another problem for those who hope for success concerns the 
unavoidable complexity of the proposed Constitution. The U.S. 
Constitution is marked by brevity, clarity, and specificity. The 
history of constitutions and constitution-making indicates that 
smaller is better when it comes to crafting a constitution intended 
to endure for more than a few generations. Jack Straw (2000), 
Britain's foreign secretary, has added that "size tells another, 
more important story-that of coherence." With few exceptions, 
lengthy, detailed constitutions have been marked by redundancy, 
inconsistency, and complexity. Short, spare constitutions tend to 
be easier to read, understand, and interpret. Further, an accessible 
constitution can be read and understood by its citizenry. Given 
these considerations, the EU Constitution faces an uphill battle. 
As a consolidating document-one that brings together and har-
monizes a cluster of already existing treaties-the EU text had to 
be comprehensive. The Convention on the Future of Europe was 
charged with the task of making the treaty system simpler and 
more coherent. It did not have the option of jettisoning the trea-
ties and starting afresh, as the Philadelphia Convention did with 
the Articles of Confederation. As a result, the EU text is, of ne-
cessity, a lengthy and complex work. 
Comparing Conventions 
Analysis of the conventions that framed the U.S. Constitution 
in 1787 and the European Constitution in 2002-2003 yields some 
notable contrasts. For one, the delegates in attendance at each 
differed in number, task, and charge. During the summer of 
1787, 55 men came together in Philadelphia as permanent, full-
TIIE JOURNAL or POLlTI Ct\L SC IEN C E 
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time delegates to consider changes and propose amendments to 
the Articles of Confederation. Despite the fact that one state, 
Rhode Island, did not send a delegation and that some of the 
delegates departed before the end of the convention, the process 
was marked by unified purpose, consistent attendance and ad-
herence to a code of secrecy. The framers locked themselves into 
a building by day, and enjoyed each other's company with dinner 
and drink by night. Many already knew each other either person-
ally or by reputation, and they formed close associations with 
one another as the summer wore on. Importantly, the participant1i 
expected to control the system that they were creating.8 Although 
there were varied interests and priorities, and a few major con-
flicts, all the participants were chosen by state legislatures and 
were beholden to the same kind of political unit, the state.9 
Also significant was the fact that most of the work done at the 
convention was accomplished in general debate. Smaller work-
ing committees ironed out the details of major propositions, but 
the most important decisions were made among the full conven-
tion assembled. Both general debate and ad hoc committees en-
joyed the protection of secrecy from the press and from the 
inhabitants of Philadelphia. Note taking was restricted, and all 
were sworn to silence between sessions. As a result, bold and 
radical initiatives could be proposed, considered and debated on 
the merits, without fear of reprisals from the public or the press. 
The result was a remarkably efficient and determined process 
8 As noted by Robinson (2003) , the delegates consisted of most of the leading figures 
from their states ; "Of the men at Philadelphia, two went on to become president , one to 
become vice-president, four to be federal cabinet ministers, 9 to be senators, 13 to be 
members of the House of Representatives , and four to be federal judges ." 
9 For what still remains the classic statement on the aspirations and motives of the Phila-
delphia delegates , see Roche (1961 ). Roche provides compelling arguments explaining 
why the convention stuck together through the summer, suffered few departures and no 
breaches of secrecy, and found ways to compromise when compromise was necessary . 
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that saw the delegates emerge at summer 's end with a spare, spe-
cific, and coherent product. 
The Convention for the Future of Europe was markedly dif-
ferent. The sixteen month long European congress drew over 200 
delegates from over twenty countries. They came from a wide 
variety of organizations and posts , and included members of na-
tional parliaments, Members of the European Parliament, mem-
bers of the European Commission, the Economic and Socia l 
Committee, and nominated representatives of national govern-
ments. 10 Many held no elected position , and it is especia lly 
noteworthy that ex-ministers outnumbered serving ministers 
three to one. Unlike the American founders , this was not a group 
that anticipated having to conduct and control the system that it 
was creating. Nor were the delegates sent as full-time or perma-
nent representatives, and so attendance was often sporadic . 
Hence the size and composition of the convention, and the 
transience of its delegates , led to a markedly different dynamic 
as the EU constitutional text was crafted. For the most part, the 
lack of fu11-time, permanent delegates meant that the core deci-
sion-making over and wording of the document took place in the 
smaller working groups, not in the main sessions. 11 One critic 
remarked that 
One can see the effect in the plenary meetings of the 
European Convention, which are too large. At all 
times, members are strolling around, chatting quietly, 
reading newspapers and using their laptops ... The at-
mosphere is neither particularly businesslike nor 
conducive to rigorous debate. Speakers have only 
three minutes to say what they want, and, as one of 
'
0 Supra note 6. 
11 This was not accidental. Critics charge that this was a continuation of elite control over 
the drafting process, as the smaller groups were dominated by the Presidium . 
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the delegates told me, 'Everyone just makes their 
speech and there is no real dialogue.' As a result, the 
real work of the conference is done in the smaller 
working groups. Nobody has the time to attend all of 
these, and there is no obvious means to ensure coher-
ence. Power thus slips into the hands of ... [the] pre-
sidium, and ... secretariat, who were not elected by the 
Convention but were chosen by the EU heads of gov-
ernment and are accountable to nobody. 12 
11 
In general, European scholars have seen neither a net gain nor 
a net loss for the democratic deficit issue during the convention. 
The large number and plurality of the delegates has been seen as 
a plus, as this helped insure that all significant interests and per-
spectives were being voiced and noted. However, the process of 
the framing itself has been viewed as a minus, as many sections 
of the text were drafted and approved without broad debate and 
free-ranging discussion of the core issues. 13 
Audience 
The European drafters found themselves accountable to a 
very different constituency than that of the Americans. As noted, 
the American delegates were sent by their state legislatures and 
were thus accountable to the citizens of those states. They de-
bated and approved the constitutional language with a view to 
how such wording would play back home. Popular opinion, at 
least as it was thought likely to influence the ratification process, 
guided the debates and decisions of the delegates. John Roche 
(1961, 812) summed up the summer in Philadelphia as follows: 
"Drawing on their vast collective political experience, utilizing 
12 Robinson, Paul. 2003. "A Dodgy Constitution," Spectator 291(9105), 8 February, p. 15. 
13 Personal interview with Dr. Miroslav Cerar, Assistant Professor of Law, University of 
Ljubljana and Advisor on Constitutional Issues to the National Assembly , Republic of 
Slovenia . Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 24, 2004 . 
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every weapon in the politician 's arsenal , looking con stantly ove r 
their shoulders at their constituents , the delegates put togethe r a 
Constitution." 
The European delegates operated while rank-and-file Europe-
ans expressed little knowledge of, or interest in, the prop osed 
constitution. A poll commissioned in mid-2003 by the Elca no 
Royal Institute, a Madrid think tank , found that only 1 % of 
Spaniards knew what the constitutional convention was meant to 
do . This poll took place after 16 month s of meetings , and as the 
draft document was ready to be released. It should again be 
noted that the European convention did not take place in secret. 
If anything, it was a "media event ," with regular press coverage 
and a dedicated website with updates and a copy of the dra ft 
document posted online at time of release. The lack of public 
interest and the presence of vested interests created a very differ-
ent kind of accountability. The formation of the European Con-
stitution took on the character of policy-making , with dozens of 
groups seeking to write protections , rights and regulations into 
the text. One commentator dryly remarked that "every conce iv-
able interest group , from labor unions to nudist groups , has made 
suggestio ns" (Coughlan , 2003 , 20). The sum total of all of the 
agreements, concessions and provision s swelled the documen t to 
an impressive size. While part of the reason behind this resu lt is 
content specific, it is also a result of the process of constitut ipn-
making. The European delegates were beholden more to the 
ever-present lobbyists and representatives that worked the floor 
of the convention than they were to the home population of Ital-
ians or Poles or Belgians. What resulted was, again , a Const itu-
tion that bears little resemblance to the brief , structuring kinds of 
documents that have in the past effectively constituted a gov-
ernment and successfully stood the test of time . 
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Timing and Urgency 
Two further, and intertwined, factors had a marked influence 
on how the EU Constitution was framed and received, and de-
serve consideration alongside the American experience. The tim-
ing of the constitutional convention and the perceived urgency of 
the task provided an impetus of the Philadelphia delegates that 
was lacking in Brussels. 
Half of the time that the newly declared United States of 
America was governed by the Articles of Confederation took 
place during the War of Independence, from 1776-1781. As the 
U.S. emerged from that conflict, it faced mounting debts and the 
need for economic recovery and stability. However, the Articles 
of Confederation restricted the powers of Congress to requisition 
of funds from the states-that is, it could authoritatively request 
funds but it could not collect taxes. It had therefore to rely on the 
good will of the states to collect and forward taxes; in addition, 
the states could not be compelled to pay their share of govern-
ment costs. The results of these arrangements were not impres-
sive. Between 1781 and 1783, the national legislature requested 
$10 million from the states but collected only $ 1.5 million 
(Pritchett, 1984, 6). The mid-l 780s shifted from economic mal-
aise to economic crisis and back. By 1786, it was apparent that 
some reconsideration of the Articles was needed, since the pro-
cedure for amending the document-a unanimous vote by the 
states-hamstrung any effort to strengthen its taxing and spend-
. 14 
mg powers. 
14 The key language of the amendment provision reads as follows: "A nd the Articles of 
this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be 
perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless 
such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards con-
firmed by the legislatures of every State ." Articles of Confederation, Article XIII. 
(http://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html#Article 13). 
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In response to this state of affairs, James Madison and Alex -
ander Hamilton held a series of meetings to raise awarene ss of 
the shortcomings of the Articles and create interest in a forum for 
considering revisions to it. During one of these meeting s, they 
urged the states to send delegations to Philadelphia for a meeting 
to be held the following May . As Epstein and Walker (2001, .S) 
explain , their "plea could not have come at a more opportu ne 
time. Just one month before , in August 1786, a former Revolu-
tionary War captain , Daniel Shays , had led disgruntled and 
armed farmers to rebellion in Massachusetts. They were protest -
ing the poor state of the economy , particularly as it affecte d 
farmers ." Though Shays ' Rebellion was suppressed by state 
forces , it was seen as another sign that the Article s neede d 
amending. In February 1787, Congress finally issued a call for a 
. 1 h . I 15 convention to reeva uate t e current nat10na system . 
The American constitutional convention arose out of eco-
nomic crisis , growing national identity and unity, a failed ( or 
failing) charter of government. and a distant armed conflict that 
was both symbolic and galvanizing . The cost of failure was high, 
and the possibility of failure never far from the thinking of the 
delegates. By contrast , the European Un ion's decision to craft a 
constitution came about during a time of economic prospe rity, 
post-independence nationalism (on the part of the newly inde-
pendent eastern European states), a cluster of confusing though 
workable treaties , and a distant armed conflict in Iraq that served 
to fracture any sense of unity among the participant nations. For 
the delegates to the European convention , the cost of failure was 
a reversion to the status quo, not the prospect of economic crisis 
and an inability to effectively govern . 
A sense of urgency, the experience of an ongoing crisis, and a 
prospect of systemic failure, were thus all absent in the Europe an 
15 See the Introduction to the U.S. Constitution in Epstein and Walker (200 I, 5). 
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case, and these factors go a long way toward explaining why it 
took sixteen months for an acceptable draft document to be 
crafted. The slow, bureaucratic process reflected the fact that the 
existing treaty system, while complex and redundant, was not 
collapsing or on the verge of failure. Some of the key procedural 
mechanisms developed in the Treaty of Nice had not yet been 
fully implemented, and awaited a follow-up conference in 2004 
for further refinement. 16 Indeed, it was only as governmental rep-
resentatives began to discuss potential changes to the draft in the 
Fall of 2003, that the document began to be described as a con-
stitutional treaty. This seemed to better reflect the hybrid nature 
of the document: a constitution that sought to harmonize and 
streamline the basket of treaties under which the EU operated. 
As noted, part of the sense of urgency felt in the American 
case resulted from Shay's Rebellion, which preceded the conven-
tion by less than a year. Perceived as a sign of the potential for 
riot and lawlessness in the face of weak government, this par-
ticular armed conflict became a catalyst for positive action. A 
more distant armed conflict intruded on the Brussels delegates as 
they were concluding their task in early 2003. The United States 
responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by con-
ducting military operations in Afghanistan and, in March of 
2003, by invading Iraq. Both were among the countries targeted 
for supplying aid and assistance to the terrorist bombers. Further, 
it was alleged that Iraq was accumulating and stockpiling bio-
logical and chemical weapons and potentially could be a supplier 
of the same. 
16 In December of 2000, the EU heads of state and government met as the European 
Council in Nice, France . Most of the discussion centered on making institutional deci-
sion-making processes more efficient before the ten countries of eastern and central 
Europe joined the EU. The summit produced a number of institutional changes that 
would require ratification by all of the (then) 15 member nations . For further detail on the 
Nice Treaty, see Wood and Yesilada (2002) . 
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The United States invaded Iraq after extended debate and an 
eventual stalemate within the United Nations Security Council. 
These debates split the key players in the European Union . Great 
Britain , Spain, Italy, and Poland supported the U.S. action and 
sent military troops to join the U.S.-led coalition forces. France, 
Germany and the Benelux nations opposed military action absent 
United Nations sanction and became vocal opponents of what 
they perceived as naked aggression on the part of the US . While 
it is impossible to quantify the degree to which the Iraq war im-
pacted the work of constitution-making in Europe , it is clear that 
the unfolding events in the Middle East created more tension and 
animosity than common purpose and agreement. As we will see 
below, Spain and Poland initially refused to give ground on a key 
political issue , the change in voting weight that lessened their 
Nice Treaty allotment (See Appendix A) . At the same time, 
France and Germany were reneging on their economic commit-
ment to hold debt levels to the percentage of GDP stipulated and 
agreed upon under the Stability and Growth Pact. 17 Great Britain 
and Italy sought to bring the two sides together , but all the while 
seeking their own concessions as the price of diplomacy. Ironi-
cally, one of the core purposes of the constitutional project-to 
unite Europe and allow it to compete against the world 's sole 
superpower - was sidelined by external events that had the 
member states choosing sides for or against that very country. 
On one key issue , the creation of a foreign minister position 
that would provide a unified voice for EU foreign policy, the Iraq 
war proved to be a painful reminder that a common view and a 
common policy were distant ideals , and that the members states 
were anything but united. The war controversies firmed the re-
17 Under the terms of the European Union ' s Stability and Growth Pact, EU countries must 
main tain publ ic deficits of no more than 3% of GDP and publi c debt of no more than 
60%ofG DP. 
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solve of a number of countries-Great Britain especially-to 
maintain a veto over foreign policy decisions. In whatever form 
a ratified EU Constitution takes, it is hard to imagine that the 
member nations will cede their sovereign powers in the areas of 
defense policy and foreign affairs. 
CONTENT: 
KEY THEMES AND PROVISIONS OF THE 
EU CONSTITUTCON 
A handful of much disputed subjects, which paralleled ques-
tions faced by the American framers, provided formidable chal-
lenges to the delegates in Brussels and the heads of government 
who met in Rome in late 2003. The most important questions 
involved the definition and distribution of power within the Un-
ion and between the Union and the member states. 
Eurofederalism: How to Define and Divide Competences. 18 
The most vigorous debates over the draft document con-
cerned the vague distribution of power between the Union and 
the member states. Like the lines drawn between the Federalists 
and the Anti-Federalists during the American founding, two dif-
ferent sides argued over the proper distribution of powers. Two 
years earlier, in 2001, the Laeken Declaration encouraged the 
member nations to clarify which competences would be exclu-
sive to the Union, which would be reserved to the member states, 
and which might be designated shared competences between the 
central and national governments. In a section that calls for a 
better division and definition of competence in the EU, the 
Laeken delegates raised the following questions in anticipation 
of a constitutional convention: At what level is competence exer-
cised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of subsidi-
18 The word "competences " is used to describe power and its distribution. 
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arity 19 to be applied here? Should we not make it clear that any 
powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the 
exclusive sphere of competence of the Member States?20 Hence, 
well in advance of the Brussels convention, the Laeken delegates 
pointed to the upcoming challenge of clearly defining the federal 
principle and of clearly distributing and limiting powers. Their 
concern was that, without precise enumeration of competences, 
there would be a "creeping expansion" of the powers of the Un-
ion and an "encroach ment" on the competences of the membet 
states. 21 
This concern was realized in 2003, during one of the last ses-
sions of the Brussels convention. Three delegates presented con-
vention president Valery Giscard d'Estaing with a letter of 
dissent signed by 18 representatives from 13 current and future 
member states. The letter contended that the emerging draft 
document undermined national sovereignty by stealth. Echoing 
this point of view, former British Prime Minister John Major at-
tacked the constitutional convention and Mr. Giscard d'Es taing 
in particular for construing competences and subsidiarity in ways 
never envisioned by the member states. 
At the heart of Giscard d'Estaing's proposals is the 
intent to replace intergovernmental decision-making 
with a new written constitution for a single European 
entity. The institutions of this European entity would 
exercise sovereign powers, with primacy over the 
laws of member states in a breathtakingly wide range 
of policy areas. Even worse, the existing protection 
19
"Subsidiarity " is the doctrine that government action should take place at the lowest 
possible, or most sensible, level. 
20Declaration of the Future of the Union, Nos . 3 and 4. Official Journal of the European 
Community, C 80/85, March 10, 2001 . The Laeken Declaration . (http ://European-
convention .eu.int/pdf/LKNEN .pdf) . 
21/bid. 
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ers inclusion of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the 
American Constitution. But the Supremacy Clause must be un-
derstood in context, and that context is one of clearly enumerated 
and delegated powers. The supremacy of the Constitution and 
the laws made pursuant to it was bound and limited by the spe-
cific grants of powers in the preceding articles. The Brusse ls 
Convention sought to create the spirit of the Supremacy Clause 
without having first set limits on competences via enumeration-
the very recommendation given by the delegates in Laeken in 
2001.23 While it is true that the process ofratification was not a 
foregone conclusion in America in the 1 780s, it can not be said 
that there was much confusion over the document itself The 
clarity with which the American Constitution answers the three 
questions posed by the Laeken Declaration is both revealing and 
enlightening. 
First, the Constitution of the United States answers the level 
of competence question by specifically and clearly delegating 
and enumerating powers. Enumeration both empowered and lim-
ited national government. Delegation presupposed that power 
was granted to government by the people, and that powers not 
delegated remain with the people. Given the failures of the A1ti-
cles of Confederation, there was a common expectation that the 
newly proposed government would have the power to tax and 
spend and to regulate commerce, thus addressing the two most 
serious economic weaknesses of Congress under that govern-
ment. Most of the other Article I, Section 8 powers granted to 
Congress involved the economy or the conduct of foreign affairs 
and war. 
23 Some scholars argue convincingly that this has been achieved, and that acceptance of 
the Constitution will ensure the supremacy of the law of the Union over the law of the 
member states. Personal interview with Dr. Theo Oehlinger, Professor of Constitutional 
Law, University of Vienna. Vienna, Austria, October 21, 2004 . Also see Oehlinger 
(2004) . 
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of a national veto largely disappears, as almost all the 
decisions would be under a system of majority vot-
ing. This is utterly unacceptable. 
So is the treatment of the concept of ' subsidiarity ' 
that was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty: it was a 
principle that was intended to ensure that the EU 
acted only where it could complement national ac-
tions. Giscard d'Estaing turns this on its head and re-
defines the distribution of power by stating baldly 
that member states may take action in defined areas 
"only if and to the extent that the Union has not exer-
cised its (competences]." 22 
19 
Mr. d'Estaing's "loose construction" of subsidiarity created a 
serious stumbling block for approval. Once the draft Constitution 
was presented to the intergovernmental meetings, specific criti-
cisms over taxation, foreign policy and immigration brought de-
bate and approval to a standstill. In each issue area, the claim 
was that the draft authorized interference with, or downright in-
vasion of, national sovereignty. Although the Constitution has 
been finalized and enacted, it is likely that the ratification de-
bates will need to re-visit and address these vigorous defenses of 
national sovereignty and a strict claim of subsidiarity. 
It can be argued that the American Constitution could have 
run into the same obstacles and criticisms because of its silences 
and sometimes vague enumerations of the distribution of power. 
Certainly the ratifying conventions in New York, Massachusetts 
and Virginia were hotly contested, and could have led to rejec-
tion of the document as a new charter of government. And it 
might be argued that Mr. d'Estaing's attempt to bolster the power 
of the EU government was no different than the American fram-
22 Major , John . 2003 . "Why We Must Veto this Alien Constitution, " Spectator, 
292(9120) 24 May, pp. 14-16. 
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Next , Sections 9 and 10 of Article I link the question of com-
petences with the second challenge of the Laeken Declaration, 
that of subsidiarity. In the U.S. Constitution, the positive grants 
of power in Section 8 give way to the prohibitions of power 
given to the national government in Section 9 and to the states in 
Section 10. Section 9 reads like a Bill of Rights for the states, 
offering an array of protections from national government inter-
ference. Section 10 limits the power of the states, though much 
of this section is reflective of Section 8, as it prohibits actions by 
the states in the same spheres of economy and foreign affairs 
where power has been granted to Congress. 
Third, the 1 Olh Amendment bridges concerns over subsidiarity 
with the call for a clear statement of reserved competences. 
While the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights cover the 
rights of individuals from actions of the legislative (1st), execu-
tive (2nd, 3rd, 4th) and judicial (5th through 8th) branches, the 10th 
Amendment protects the powers (not rights) of the states. While 
two centuries of Supreme Court interpretation and decision have 
served to either enhance or erode the reserved power of the 
states, the Amendment has maintained its vitality. 
The enumeration of exclusive powers given to the central EU 
government in the draft Constitution is actually quite short. Most 
of the powers that are usually exercised by national governments 
are listed in the concurrent, or shared category. But the proposed 
EU Constitution also contains mechanisms that will allow euro-
federal authorities to take over as many of those shared powers 
as they feel necessary.24 What is missing from the EU text is a 
listing of the exclusive powers of the national governments. One 
could argue that this is not necessary, since member states retain 
all powers that are not otherwise listed- an "understood" 10th 
Amendment of sorts. But worries have persisted since the inter-
24/bid , at 402-405. 
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governmental debates that very little of significance was left at 
the national level, and that the movement of power was a one-
way street, from the national to the federal level. Consequently, 
some critics continue to worry that the lack of clear enumeration 
of competences will steadily move power toward Brussels, and 
that this issue could become a stumbling block for at least one 
member nation as the ratification phase takes place. 
Big States and Small States: Weighing Power and Votes 
The struggle to establish a balance of power between large, 
populous states and smaller, less populated ones has been as dif-
ficult in Europe as it was during the founding period in the US. 
In 1787, the big states such as Virginia, New'York and Massa-
chusetts were the main proponents of the Virginia Plan, the 
scheme of representation that would allot power proportionately 
by population. In present-day Europe the 6 biggest states-
Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland-account for 
74% of the population in an enlarged EU of 25 member states 
and 450 million inhabitants. The question of population politics 
is compounded by the economic equation: the same big 6 nations 
account for 84% of the European Union's yearly economic out-
put. Under the current voting rules established in the Treaty of 
Nice, the big 6 could be outvoted by the other nations, 170-175 
(See Appendix A).25 The Benelux nations-Belgium, Nether-
lands and Luxembourg-have the same total votes as Germany, 
though their combined population is one-third of Germany's. 
In the case of the US, the ideological and practical difficulties 
within the big state/small state conflict led to the Great Com-
promise of 1787, which split the legislative branch into a House 
25 Note that the Treaty of Nice includes the potential voting weights of both Bulgaria and 
Romania, thus bringing the total number of EU members to 27 . Both countries are slated 
to join the EU in 2007 . Without these two nations , the "big six " would actually have a 
majority vote of 170-151 over the other 19 members . 
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of Representatives designed to reflect popular will and whose 
membership is proportional to population, and a Senate that 
gives each state equal standing and equal representation. 26 By 
contrast, the European Constitution has proposed a complicated 
system of representation with a number of institutions exercising 
"shared comptetences." 27 Two elements of the EU document's 
legislative scheme became focal points of debate and disagree-
ment, and led to significant changes in the document prior to its 
final approval in mid-2004. 
First, the EU Constitution calls for most measures to pass 
with a "qualified voting majority," or QVM. As it applies to the 
Council of Ministers, which has the authority-jointly with Par-
liament-to enact legislation and control the budget, the key lan-
guage reads as follows: "A qualified voting majority shall be 
defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, compris-
ing at least fifteen of them, representing member states compris-
ing at least 65% of the population of the Union."28 This provision 
emerges from a big state/small state compromise. Smaller na-
tions can resist legislative measures that threaten their interests 
by a simple up-or-down vote, since the Council's composition is 
one minister per member state. However, more populous nations 
26 The Great Compromise solved an important ideological question as well as addressing 
the struggle over the proper framework of representation. Many delegates to the Phila-
delphia convention were present as representatives of the states , and the Constitution was 
a creation of the states . For others, the convention was a gathering of representatives of 
the people, and the Constitution was a charter of the people . The text of the Constitution 
reflects this tension, as it begins, "We the People of the United States ... " in the Preamble 
and closes (if we assume the ratified text closed with the IO"' Amendment) with "The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people ." The Great Compromise 
allowed partisans of both sides to secure a power base . 
27 See section entitled "European Parliament" in Europa. http//europaeu.in\/abc/121essonslprint_ dex4_en.hlm. 
28 Draft Constitution of the European Union, Article 1-24. http://european-conventioneu.int Also, 
note that on questions such as amending treaties, proposing common policy, or allowing a new 
country to join the European Union, a unanimous vote is required. 
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are able to protect their interests through the 65% population 
requirement. Three or four of the largest nation s allied together 
can effectively block legislation favored by a large percentage of 
the member states. The provision changes the weightings of 
votes agreed to in Nice , but fortifies Nice 's original intent. As 
much as the Nice format has been criticized, its intent reflected 
one of the aims of the Great Compromise: to protect the interests 
of both big states and small states . 
This aim is also reflected in the voting distribution in the 
Council of the European Union . In this institution , the Nice 
treaty awarded votes in such a way that clustered the larger coun-
tries together , and weighted votes to give the larger current 
members a greater voting weight relative to smaller members 
(See Appendix A). The small states were compen sated by having 
the ability to block a measure if a simple majority of countries 
voted against it regardless of size or population . The voting 
weights agreed to in Nice will remain in place if the ratification 
of the Constitution is either delayed or if it fails. 
During the framing phase , Spain and Poland had the most to 
lose under the Constitution's proposed qualified majority system 
of representation . Under Nice , both had voting power far in ex-
cess of their respective populations . Poland also had a political 
problem to deal with. It had promoted EU membership to its citi-
zens based on the Nice agreements , and the Polish referendum 
on membership reflected those understandings. Polish leaders 
did not want to be accused of running a "bait and switch " scam 
on the voters, and "not surprisingly , weren 't keen on committing 
political suicide by giving in" during the talks in Rome .29 Spain 's 
power would also be reduced under the new system . Political 
considerations also came into play as the Spaniards considered 
29 Editorial, "Europe's Fortunate Failure," Wall Street Journal, 16 December, 2003, p. A-16. 
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their options during the Fall. One American newspaper com-
mented that, 
The Spaniards also got a worse deal than at Nice. 
Spanish officials are all too aware that the "double 
majority" provisions were drafted in a back room at 
the time when Spain and Poland were signing up for 
a major role in post-war peacekeeping in Iraq. France 
and Germany never hid their desire to institutionalize 
the anti-Americanism underpinning of their crusade 
against the war in Iraq. The double majority would 
have made it easier for them to set EU policy.30 
The combination of political, legal, and institutional problems 
led Spain and Poland to oppose the double majority provision of 
the constitution. In many ways, the debate over the double ma-
jority was the only agenda item within the discussions of late 
2003. Although a raft of other concerns waited their turn on the 
sidelines, the difficulties of big states/small states politics domi-
nated the enactment debates. 
Spain and Poland did not prevail in maintaining their voting 
weights in the new constitution. Mid-2004 elections brought in a 
new government in Spain, and there was a clear indication that 
the new administration was going to drop its threat of resisting 
passage. Poland, suddenly the lone voice of dissent, soon began 
to soften its stance toward the new voting weights. Within a few 
weeks, the view that the draft text would be approved and sent 
forward for ratification became the prevailing one. 
After the debate over voting weights, a second important big 
state/small state conflict lurked in the shadows. The smaller EU 
states had already voiced their concerns over the proposal to re-
duce their power and visibility by trimming back the number of 
30 Ibid . 
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EU commissioners. A tentative decision reached at Nice allowed 
the possibility of capping the number of commissioners at 
twenty, without further indication of what would happen when 
the ten new member states were brought into the Union . There 
was some speculatio n that the smaller nations would have to de-
velop a system of rotating commissioners, as it was generally 
accepted that the Commission had reached its size limit for ef-
fective and efficient decision-making. 
The new Constitution proposed to cut the number of Com-
missioners down to fifteen. What looked problematic coming out 
of Nice now looked disastrous. Suddenly, the biggest issue for 
the smaller nations was that each should retain the right to have 
its own commissioner-shades of the New Jersey Plan! Not sur-
prisingly, the larger states had no taste for this, as they regarded 
it as a recipe for an overly large and unwieldy commission . Fur-
ther, they saw the one-state, one-commissioner system as unfair. 
It ceded too much power to the low population, weak economy 
states. 
In April of 2003, representatives from seven smaller nations 
met in Luxembourg in what the German newspapers derided as a 
summit of the "Seven Dwarfs." The concerns raised at this meet-
ing and at others that followed led to a postponement of chang-
ing the makeup of the Commission. Ultimately, the smaller states 
prevailed. Between December 2003 and the approval of the final 
draft six months later, the Commission 's structure was revised to 
reflect equal representation of the member states. From Novem-
ber 1, 2004 forward, the new Commission held 25 members-
one commissioner per country. The constitutional text maintains 
the one-representative-per-nation allotment. 
Back to Legitimacy 
Beyond the discussion of competences hes the more genera l 
and perhaps deeper, more difficult problem of democratic legiti-
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macy. The EU constitution must root its identity and legitimacy 
in the people. The earlier cited poll that revealed either ignorance 
or ambivalence among Spaniards during the convention process 
is indicative of the problem here. Whether we describe the con-
stitutional treaty as federal or confederated in structure, it cannot 
be described as a product of "we the people." It remains far more 
a treaty among nation states than a constitution of the governed . 
Historian Jack Rakove has determined that 
The Convention on the Future of Europe was con-
ceived both as a means of rationalizing, redacting, 
and (to some extent) superceding the past treaties that 
have been instruments of European integration, and 
of further defining and refining the "competences " 
and the institutions of the EU. Though the ambition 
of promoting a genuine constitution for Europe has a 
laudable ring to it, the reality still seems far from pro-
saic. Can a set of institutional arrangements that ulti-
mately depends on negotiations among member 
states ever form a constitution in the robust sense? 
Can a constititional treaty ever become more consti-
tution than treaty? For what remains most difficult to 
conjure is the political identity of the new entity that 
Eurofederalists contemplate creating . Critics charge 
that this new community ' s political vision is indelibly 
elitist, bureaucratic and technocratic and that the new 
Europe being fashioned will never mobilize the patri-
otic affections of the citizens whose lives it will regu-
late. There is little in the draft constitution that will 
alter this view (Rakove, 2003, 33). 
The EU draft document seeks to coordinate institutions and 
arrangements that have been agreed upon within successive trea-
ties over the last few decades. It has in this sense "inherited" the 
legitimacy problem , as it seeks to better codify and integrate the 
past treaties. This is why it reads in places more like an adminis-
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trative handbook than a manifesto of political integration. By 
whatever name you call it, constitution, constitutional treaty or 
charter, the fact remains that the problem of ratification can be 
directly linked to the distance between the document and the 
people . 
There, again, is the rub. The people of Europe must play a 
central role in the process of ratifying and confirming the docu-
ment. In order to gain popular consent and widespread legiti-
macy, a constitution must reflect and embody popular will. The 
clear disconnect between the content of the EU Constitution and 
the process of its approval-as each member nation submits it to 
some form of vote-may prove to be the most daunting cha l-
lenge of all. 
CONFIR MAT ION: 
T HE STIP ULATIO NS AND PROCE DURES FOR 
RA TJFICAT ION 
Rules Determine Outcom es 
The American presidential election of 2000 bore witness to 
the consequences of the rules determining the outcome. The EU 
Constitut ion's prov isions for debate, amendment proposal, and 
ratification are not neutral and inconsequential guidelines. 
Rather, the document's process of confirmation contains as many 
challenges and potential pitfalls as its content and its distributio n 
of powers. 
Unanimous Approval. Spain and Poland were able to press 
their claims over voting distribution because each had the power 
of the veto. The EU Constitution requires that ratification be 
unanimous. In this regard, the EU Constitution bears greater re-
semblance to the Articles of Confederation than to the Constit u-
tion of the United States. While the Articles had many notab le 
weaknesses, its fatal flaw was the requirement that any amend-
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ments to it be approved unanimously by the thirteen colonies. 
This proved impossible, and no amendments were passed during 
the time that the Articles were in force. The economic, cultural 
and social differences between the colonies virtually ensured that 
any proposed amendment would intrude on some power or pre-
rogative of one of them. The Articles were thus hidebound, and 
the other weaknesses that emerged over time could not be ade-
quately addressed. This took place against a background of a 
cluster of colonies that were, comparatively, never sovereign in 
the full sense of the term, and that had much in common. 31 The 
American population consisted in the main of immigrant groups 
that were tied more to land than to political units. They were also 
quite mobile, able to cross political boundaries in search of eco-
nomic opportunity or social advancement. For historian Jack 
Rakove, the contrast of America in the late 18th Century with 
modem Europe could not be more profound. 
All EU members are nation-states possessing full po-
litical sovereignty and a self-conscious sense of their 
historical peoplehood. For many of these nations, the 
relative novelty of their status as self-governing enti-
ties (as compared to the United States) may deepen, 
rather than weaken, their reluctance to relinquish na-
tional sovereignty to the faceless bureaucrats in Brus-
sels and to obscure parliamentarians in Strasbourg. 
Each European nation-state has conducted its own 
foreign relations, and each is aware of the conse-
quences of losing its capacity to assert its national in-
terests (Rakove, 2003, 33-4). 
At present, each of the voting EU member states is a veto of 
one. Each has the power and ability to procedurally block the 
passage of the Constitution or threaten to block passage until 
"See earlier discussion and Weiler (2001, 56-57). 
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certain concessions are made. The unanimous confirmation re-
quirement enabled Spain and Poland to bring the approval proc-
ess to a standstill over the first conflict that arose. If agreement 
can be reached on voting distribution, all of the rest of the consti-
tutional provisions potentially face a similar response from at 
least one member state. 
The 1787 Philadelphia convention succeeded in part because 
the delegates knew that the Articles of Confederation needed to 
be replaced rather than revised. The framers of the Constitution 
looked back on its shortcomings as they developed the proce-
dures for ratifying the document. Out went the unanimity re-
quirement. The text called for a supermajority-9 of the 13 
colonies-to ratify before the Constitution became the law of the 
land. This framework still required a substantial amount of 
agreement on the part of the states, but eliminated the threat of 
absolute veto from any individual state. As a result, each state 
ratifying convention had to face the possibility that it could reject 
the new government and that it would still be brought into being 
by the other states. The ability to veto and thwart the process was 
replaced by the potential to reject and be left as an outcast. While 
many of the state debates were heated and the final tallies close, 
the whole process took less than one year and the overall vote 
was, eventually, unanimous.32 Much of this success can be linked 
to the rules set for ratification. 
Amendment Proposals. The months following the unveiling 
of the EU draft constitution included time for member states to 
propose and discuss potential changes to the text. From October 
2003 to March 2004, EU governments planned to meet and come 
32 I mark the closing point with New York's vote in July of 1788 as the eleventh state to 
ratify . North Carolina and Rhode Island did not endorse the Constit ution during this time 
and briefly left the Union . 1l1eir eventual decision to ratify and join was more an adden-
dum to the process than an essential component of it. But, their actions did make the 
process of ratification unanimous. 
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to agreement on amendments, although there was pressure from 
the delegates to the Brussels conventions to tinker with the text 
as little as possible. 33 The deadline for signing off on the text was 
in June, with each country holding its ratification vote in 2005-
2006. While some leaders groused about the timeline for initial 
approval, the schedule itself did not occasion much debate. Yet 
the lengthy draft text presented too inviting a target and con-
tained something for everyone to question or dislike. As a result, 
although the main debates centered on competences and voting 
rights, members began to propose amendments concerning taxa-
tion, the conduct of foreign affairs and the inclusion of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights. By year-end 2003, the mammoth text 
proved to be too hard to swallow in one, unanimous, gulp. And 
though approval was secured in June of 2004, it seems unlikely 
that all of the built-in compromises and silent omissions will go 
unnoticed during the months of ratification debates. As the en-
acted document was being printed and distributed, a common 
observation was that many key decisions had been pushed aside 
or rolled back for the time being. 
This situation presents another striking contrast with the 
American experience. The draft document produced in Philadel-
phia was spare, barely 7000 words in length, limiting itself to 
providing a framework of government and an enumeration of 
core powers. And when the Constitution was presented to the 
states, it required that approval be without revision or amend-
ment. Amendments could be recommended but could not be re-
quired for approval. Article V, itself a model of brevity, spelled 
33 Note the charge from convention chairman Valery Giscard d ' Estaing , as he warned the 
delegates against seeking to amend the document: "If you touch the equilibrium , the 
system collapses . If you try to gain by getting satisfaction here and there, the system 
collapses and you have the whole thing starting again" (Mitchener , Brandon . 2003 . " Birth 
of a Nation? As Europe Unites , Religion , Defense Still Stand in the Way," Wall Street 
Journal 11 July, pp A-1 & A-6) . 
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out the procedures for proposing and ratifying amendments, and 
could be utilized once the Constitution was in force. But, for rati-
fication of the Constitution itself, the Federalist leaders prevailed 
in requiring that the approval of the individual states be inde-
pendent of any amendment proposals. 
What enabled the ratification process to succeed in the 1780s, 
majority approval of the document without amendments, cannot 
be duplicated within the European experience. TI1e European 
Constitution is neither spare nor brief, and is brimming with sub-
stantive and procedural detail. The prolix Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights is a constitution within a constitution, and will require 
considerable debate and review. While it is possible to think that 
the unanimity requirement could be dropped in the months to 
come, it is difficult to imagine how the EU text could be subject 
to a straight "up or down" vote without amendments, or subject 
to amendments only after ratification. The length, detail and 
complexity of the document make such streamlined procedures 
virtually impossible. 
CONCLUSION: 
VOX POPULI, RATIFICATION, AND PROSPECTS FOR 
THE FUTURE 
As the EU member states begin the process of ratification, 
they will do so by referendum, by parliamentary vote, or, in 
some cases, by both methods. 34 We can note one other difference 
between this smorgasbord of European approval procedures and 
the American counterpart. The Philadelphia convention asked the 
states to arrange for state ratifying conventions, separate bodies 
that would come together for the sole purpose of considering the 
34At the time this is being written, nine nations will hold a referendum to decide the new 
constitution's fate: Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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new Constitution and that would reflect popular will in ways that 
the individual legislatures could not. The European member 
states, by contrast, are subject to the specific mandates within 
their own national constitutions. 
This is likely good news and bad news for the new Constitu-
tion 's prospects. The referendum process may link the document 
to the people in ways that the framing process has not yet been 
able to do. The votes will extend media coverage and enlarge 
discussion of the provisions in the text. A much higher percent-
age of citizens will weigh the costs and benefits of unity and in-
tegration (with the attendant compromises and concessions) 
versus continued sovereignty and disaggregation (with the atten-
dant complexity and lack of coordination within the Union). 
The bad news is that one or more member states may vote the 
Constitution down. The contentious and controversial issues that 
have occasioned calls for amending the text may be the same 
issues that spell its doom at the ballot box or on the floor of a 
national parliament. While governmental officials, bureaucrats 
and media elites have at the time of this writing begun to "talk 
up" the ratification votes, rank-and-file Europeans remain 
slightly supportive of but also largely ignorant about what the 
proposed Constitution does and what effect it will have on their 
lives. Support, while mildly positive, is perhaps more of a per-
ception that the proposed Constitution would be a good devel-
opment rather than a vote of support for its specific policy 
changes. 
While comparing the development of the first constitution of 
the 21st Century with one of the last constitutions of the 19th Cen-
tury is fraught with difficulty and subject to spurious connections 
and correlations, a survey of the surrounding context, key con-
flicts and rules for ratification yields important and intriguing 
insights. Long and complex constitutions have not had good sur-
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vival records over the past three centuries . The grant of power 
from sovereign to government must be clear, explicit and 
bounded. The procedural rules for ratification must streamline 
rather than hamstring the approval process. 
The conclusion is not that the European Constitution should 
pattern itself after its American counterpart. However , the Euro-
pean framers may want to take a second look back across the 
Atlantic and back across time if the current document is to be 
ratified as the new charter of government and successfully im-
plemented as the law of the land. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
TIIE FRAMING OF THE EU CONSTITUTION 35 
-·-· ·-····-··- -
APPE 'DIX A 
VOTI G WEIGHTS IN THE COLI CIL OF MINISTERS 
as Projected in the Treaty of Nice 
- ------ - .. -········-··· ---- --
Country Population Current New 
Germany 82.0 10 29 
Britain 59.2 10 29 
France 59.0 10 29 
Italy 57.6 10 29 
S ain 39.4 8 27 
Poland 38.7 27 
Romania* 22 .5 14 
--
Netherlands 15.8 5 13 
Greece 10.5 5 13 
CzechRe ublic 10.3 12 
Belgium 10.2 5 12 
. -·-- __ }:fun~ 10.1 12 
Porh1 al 10.0 5 12 
Sweden 8.9 4 10 
Bulgaria* 8.2 10 
Austria 8.1 4 10 
Slovakia 5.4 7 
Denmark 5.3 3 7 
Finland 5.2 3 7 
Ireland 3.7 3 7 
.. ------·-
Lithuania 3.7 7 
Latvia 2.4 4 
Slovenia 2.0 4 
Estonia 1.4 4 
C rus 0.8 4 
---
Luxembourg 0.4 2 4 
Malta 0.4 3 
* Bui aria and Romania as ire to ·oin the EU in 2007. 
VOL. 33 2005 
36 BOYLAN 
REFERENCES 
Cerar, Miroslav. 2004. Personal interview with Dr. Miroslav Cerar, 
Assistant Professor of Law,University of Ljubljana and Advi-
sor on Constitutional Issues to the National Assembly, Repub-
lic of Slovenia . Ljubljana , Slovenia . September 24. 
Coughlan , John. 2003. "God and Caesar in the New Europe ." America 
189(3): p. 20. 
Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker. 2001. Constitutional la w f or a 
Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints. 
Washington , DC: Congressional Quarterly Press . 
Laeken Declaration. 2001. "Declaration of the Future of the Union, No . 
3 and 4." Official Journal of the European Community 
C80/85(March 1 O).http:/ /Europeanconvention.eu.int/pdt7LKNEN.pdf 
Moravcsik , Andrew . 2001. "Federalism in the European Union : Rheto-
ric and Reality ." In The Federal Vision, Kalypso Nicolaidis 
and Robert House (eds). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Oehlinger, Theo . 2004a. Personal interview with Dr. Theo Oehlinger , 
Professor of Constitut ional Law, University of Vienna . Vi-
enna, Austria. October 21. 
Oehlinger , Theo . 2004b . "Suprema Lex Europea: The Supremacy of 
Union Law in the Light of the Draft Treaty of a Constitution 
for the European Union." English language version in Me-
langes. Association de Droit Constitiutionnel de Serbie. Bel-
grade: Pavle Nikolic Press. pp. 401-414 . 
Pritchett, C. Herman . 1984. Constitutional Law of the Federal System. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall. 
Rakove , Jack. 2003. "Europe 's Floundering Fathers." Foreign Policy 
138(September/October) , pp. 28-38. 
Roche, John R. 1961. "The Founding Fathers : A Reform Caucus in 
Action." American Political Science Review 55(4) : 799-816 . 
TH E J OU RN AL OF POLIT ICAL SCIENCE 
THE FRAMI NG OF THE EU CONSTITUTION 37 
Seigan, Bernard H. 1994 . Drafting a Constitution for a Nation or Re-
Public Emerging into Freedom . Fairfax , VA : George Mason 
University Press. 
Shaw , Jo. 2003. "What ' s in a Convention ? Proc ess and Substance in 
the project of European Constitution Buildin g." In The Con-
vention on the Future of Europe: Working Towardsand EU 
Constitution , Jo Shaw , Paul Magnette , Lars Hoffmann , and 
Anna VergesBausili (eds .). The Federal Trust Series , Future of 
European Parliamentary Democracy 6. London : The Feder al 
Trnst for Education and Research . 
Straw, Jack. 2002. "A Constitution for Europe. " Economist (October 
10). 
Weiler, J.H.H. 200 I. "Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europ e's 
Sonderweg. " In The Federal Vision, Kalypso Nicolaidi s and 
Robert House (eds.). ew York : Oxford University Press . 
Wood, David M. and Biro! A. Yesilada . 2002. The Emerging European 
Union. New York: Longman Publishers . 
V Oi ,. 33 2005 
